Mitigating 'anticommons' harms to research in science and technology by David, P.A.
  
 
Mitigating 'anticommons' harms to research in science
and technology
Citation for published version (APA):
David, P. A. (2011). Mitigating 'anticommons' harms to research in science and technology. (UNU-MERIT
Working Papers; No. 001). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and
Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2011
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
#2011-001 
 
Mitigating 'anticommons' harms to research in science and technology 
Paul A. David 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology 
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499, email: info@merit.unu.edu, URL: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 
   
Working Paper Series 
 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and 
Technology, UNU-MERIT 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research 
carried out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
Mitigating “Anticommons” Harms to Research
In Science and Technology
New Moves in “Legal Jujitsu” against Adverse Consequences of the
  Exploitation of IPR on Publicly and Privately Funded Research Results
Paul A. David
Stanford University,
 Ecole Polytechnique &Telecom ParisTech,
 United Nations University-MERIT (Maastricht) 
pad@stanford.edu
First version: 15 June 2009
Second version: 18 October 2010
This version: 6 December 2010
Publicationforthcomingin
TheWIPOJournal:AnalysisandDebateofIntellectualPropertyIssues
ABSTRACT
There are three analytically distinct layers  of  the phenomenon that  has been labeled “the
anticommons” and indicted as a potential impediment to innovation resulting from patenting
and  enforcement  of  IPR obtained  on  academic  research results.  This  paper  distinguishes
among  “search  costs”,  “transactions  costs”,  and  “multiple  marginalization”  effects  in  the
pricing of licenses for commercial use of IP, and examines the distinctive  resource allocation
problems arising from each when exclusion rights over research inputs are distributed among
independent  owners.  Where  information  use-rights  are  gross  complements  (either  in
production  or  consumption),  multiple  marginalization—seen  here  to  be   the  core  of  the
“anticommons” – is  likely to result  in  extreme forms of “royalty stacking” that  can pose
serious  impediments  to  R&D  projects.  The  practical  consequences,  particularly  for
exploratory scientific research (contrasted with commercially-oriented R&D) are seen from a
heuristic analysis of the effects of distributed ownership of scientific and technical database
rights. A case is presented for the contractual construction of “research resource commons”
designed as efficient IPR pools, as the preferable response to the anticommons.     
Keywords:  anticommons, R&D, multiple marginalization, IPR licensing, patent hold-ups,
royalty stacking, distributed scientific databases, copyright collections societies, contractual
commons 
JEL Classification Codes: L24, O31, O34, O38  

Mitigating “Anticommons” Harms to Research
In Science and Technology
Introduction and Overview
Most of the discussion and debate among legal scholars and economists concerning the so-called
‘anticommons’  has  been  restricted  to  questions  about  the  existence  and  seriousness  of  the
obstacles  to  discovery,  invention and innovation that  Heller  and Eisenberg1 suggested could
result  from  “over-patenting”  in  the  biomedical  research  area.   But  the  anticommons,  as  a
conceptualization  of  the  perverse  resource  allocation  effects  of  the  distribution  of  private
ownership rights, has a considerably wider potential range of empirical relevance, and warrants
commensurately  more  careful  study.   This  article  underscores  that  analytical  point,  first  by
considering a stylized model of the impediments imposed upon the conduct of research by the
burdensome licensing charges that arise from the dispersed distribution of ownership rights in a
multiplicity of research tools that are complementary.
  To make more transparent the generic character of the argument, the exposition in this heuristic
analysis will focus on multiple database resources as the “research tools” of interest, individual
access rights to each of which are held by different IP right owners.  Adopting that approach both
recognizes  the  emergence  and  growing  role  of  digital  databases  as  critical  facilities  of  the
research infrastructure in many scientific and technical domains, and serves to demonstrate the
generality  of  the  phenomenon  of  “multiple  marginalization”  that  emerges  from  the
uncoordinated  exercise  of  market  power  by  individual  rent-seeking  rights-holders  in  setting
licensing charges on their intellectual property rights. .
  Having briefly examined the relationship between that “core” phenomenon and other parts of
the “anatomy of the anticommons,” I turn next to consider whether market processes themselves
could not  correct  the pathology.   This  part  of the discussion briefly  exposes several  serious
limitations  of  what  may  be  viewed  as  the  likely  “spontaneous,”  profit-driven  institutional
responses that could emerge to mitigate the anticommons – in imitation of the private copyright
clearance agencies and music performance rights collection societies.  As it is unreasonable to
expect that effective remedial developments of that kind will be forthcoming, there is a stronger
case for pursuing new policies that would promote the “contractual construction” of scientific
research commons, by common-use licensing agreements among the owners of IP arising from
publicly funded scientific projects.  This ‘bottom-up’ approach offers a path toward more far-
reaching institutional changes that would mitigate some of the unintended consequences of the
spread of efforts to claim and exploit intellectual property rights based upon publicly funded
university research results.
Understanding the “anticommons” – a brief anatomical tour
1 M.A. Heller and R.S. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research” Science, 280,
1998: pp. 698 ff.
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  There are three analytically distinct layers of the troublesome object that has been labeled “the
anticommons.” Each layer is associated with a different kind of problem that may arise from the
distribution of perfect exclusion rights over resources, rights of the sort that are conveyed by
legal property ownership – and by intellectual property monopolies in particular. Searching to
locate the owners of relevant rights, negotiating with those rights owners from whom access
rights are needed, and paying the pecuniary charges for the licenses that are granted, are the three
layered activities and each may impose costly burdens on enterprises that require access to the
use of such assets when they are both numerous and in the hands of many other parties.
   It  is  important  to  distinguish  among  these  potential  sources  of  costs  for  scientific  and
technological research enterprises in which legally protected property rights restrict access to the
use of required informational resources that represent “inputs”. Their economic implications are
differently affected by the structure of productive relationships among the resources that enter
into the research process,  and particularly by the degree of  technical  complementary  among
various “research assets” that fall under the control of diverse owners of exclusion rights (such as
are  conveyed  by  IPR  ownership).  Furthermore,  dealing  separately  with  these  parts  of  the
anatomy of the anticommons acknowledges that such inefficiencies in the allocation of research
resource as they would occasion may differ in seriousness, be amenable in different degrees to
market solutions, or, failing that, require distinctive institutional remedies.
We may start “peeling the onion” of the anticommons with most immediately accessible layer,
search costs. These are entailed in order to determine whether particular “tools” described in the
scientific  research literature  –  such as  databases,  or  fast  algorithms for  mass  spectrographic
analysis, or specific biotechnology techniques (enzyme restriction methods, polymerase chain
reaction, monoclonal antibodies, and others that are less well known) – are in the public domain
or under patents, and if so who owns the rights to use them. The necessary searches that projects
might conduct can be time consuming, and the mount in cost when many such tools are needed
and the rights to use each of them can be in the hands of different owners. Similarly, finding all
the specialized annotated databases containing the chromosomal locations of genetic mutations,
or extended series of satellite images showing the locations and durations of plankton blooms
and other oceanographic phenomena, and identifying whether each map or image is available in
the public  domain,  or under copyright protections owned by various parties,  would be quite
burdensome when they are not collected and made available by a single licensing intermediary. 
  The transactions costs constitute the next layer and are distinct from search costs, because they
arise only after one has identified the owner(s) of the IPR and begun to seek a license, or an
agreement to transfer materials. Under the heading of transaction costs belong the time spent by
lawyers  or  other  negotiating agents  –  including the  interested  researchers  who may  need to
personally contact members of other research groups at a firm or university that holds the IPR;
they may have to work out a research collaboration as a way of arranging for cross-licensing, to
gain access data or techniques or transfers of materials between laboratories. 
  The “transactions costs” aspects of the anticommons problem received particular emphasis in
the  testimony  gathered during  1997-98  Tools  from  29  biomedical  firms  and  32  academic
institutions by the NIH Working Group on Research, according to Eisenberg’s analysis of that
testimony2:
2 R.S. Eisenberg, “Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This market Failing or Emerging?”  in R.
Dreyfuss, D.L. Zimmerman and H. First (eds.), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001.
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“The exchange of research tools with the biomedical research community often involves
vexing and protracted  negotiations  over  terms and value.  Although owners  and users  of
research tools  usually  mange to  work out  their  differences  when the transactions  matter
greatly to both sides, difficult negotiations often cause delays in research and sometimes lead
to the abandonment of research plans ….The result has been burdensome and frustrating case
by case negotiations over exchanges that  in an earlier  era might  have occurred between
scientists without formal legal agreements.
“….The foregoing discussion suggests some features of a market for intellectual property
that  may  impede  agreement  upon  terms  of  exchange,  including  high  transactions  costs
relative  to  likely  gains  for  exchange,  participation  of  heterogeneous  institutions  with
different  missions,  complex  and  conflicting  agendas  of  different  agents  within  these
institutions, and difficulties in evaluating present and future intellectual property rights when
profits are speculative and remote.”
  If a number of research tools and inputs are required, the sunk costs for each agreement that is
negotiated may yield little of value to the project if they are strict complements of another “tool”
for which no access agreement can be concluded. “Hold-ups” occur when owners refuse to deal,
or wait until all the other properties have been assemble and seek to extract all the available
“rent” in exchange for completing the tool-package. When the components of the package are in
many hands, the risks of this rise, since it is more difficult to determine the likelihood that one of
the IPR owners –for one is all it takes—will behave in this strategic matter. In some sense, the
latter amounts to a second order search cost problem. Search and transactions costs, as they have
been  defined  here,  are  incurred  before  any  deals  can  be  concluded,  and  it  should  be
acknowledged  that  specialized  intermediaries  could  undertake  to  carry  out  the  search  and
transaction  negotiations.  Economies  of  scale  and  scope,  and  free  entry  into  that  business
therefore would work to contain these costs even as the number of parties increased.
  Yet, where entry can is blocked by monopoly rights to the use of inventions, as can occur when
there are critical patents on research tool,  the “hold-up” problem takes an exacerbated form.
Lemley and Shaprio’s analysis of “patent holdups” demonstrates that in a bargaining setting the
threat to obtain a permanent injunction, preventing a perceived infringer from using the patent
can be expect to greatly enhances the patent holder’s negotiating power, leading to licensing
agreements at royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark range based on the value of the
patented technology and the patent’s strength. 3
  “Royalty staking” refers to the fact that what may be small royalty charges on each of a number
of separately protected items of intellectual property, (whether patents or copyrights) can “stack
up” to collective a significantly high cost on the product or service that requires their use.  The
circumstances in which this is likely to occur involve intellectual property, or other privately
held  resources  the  ownership  of  which  is  distributed.  When,  those  elements  are  strongly
complementary in use, this creates the core anticommons phenomenon that has the potential to
critically burden research and innovation projects – namely, the effect on the price of access to
the entire bundle of tools (or component inputs of a multi-element system) when royalties are set
separately by the owners of each of the constituent elements in the bundle.
3 M.A. Lemley and C. Shapiro, “Patent Hold-up and Royalty-Stacking” Texas Law Review, 85, 2007: pp. 1991 ff. [Available at:
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/Shapiro (last accessed October 26, 2010).]
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  The source of the problem of  royalty-stacking is not simply that there are number element, for
each of which a fee is demanded,  but that the elements forming the bundle of access rights
required by the user are each held by a different owner, and the owners do not act in concert
when setting their royalty rate. Instead, they in effect ignore the effects of the royalties the other
owners will be trying to extract from the same user.  To restate this key point in slightly different
terms, the distribution of exclusion rights to multiple items means that they may be priced in a
way that disregards the negative pecuniary externalities of raising the price on any single item.
The form of  royalty  stacking referred to  as  “multi-marginalization” severely compounds  the
patent hold-up problem (and IPR hold-ups more generally, as will be seen) when the constituent
elements of a system are not substitutes for each another.  Consequently, when a collection of
research  tools  and  information  resources  are  gross  complements,  such  that  the  incremental
benefit of any one of them to the user is increased by using more of the others, and the IPR
controls on access to the use of each are held by different owners, the resulting inefficiency in
resource  allocation  will  be  the  dual  of  the  inefficiency  that  results  when  goods  subject  to
congestions externalities are left in the public domain.
  This duality has been shown to exist analytically by Buchanan and Yoon4, who responded to
the challenge in Heller’s original paper on “The Tragedy of the Anticommons.”5 Heller had
remarked that there was no formal analysis that proved his intuition that dispersed property rights
might impede the workings of markets. Buchanan and Yoon set up a simple model in which the
pricing  of  strictly  complementary  components  by  their  owners  ignores  the  negative  income
effects (pecuniary externalities)  that  their  supply price would have upon the demand for the
project as a whole. The combined effect of all the vendors’ independent decisions is found to be
to so raise the price of each item in the bundle of commodities that the quantity demanded of the
entire bundle will be driven not only below the efficient use level that would obtain if every item
was priced at its marginal cost, but lower than what would result if a single monopolist held all
the items and priced them to maximized her profits on the whole lot.
  Although  there  has  been  much  discussion  regarding  the  seriousness  in  practice  of  the
“anticommons  problem”  as  an  inhibitor  of  commercial  innovation,  a  considerable  body  of
empirical  evidence  has  accumulated  which  shows  that  royalty  staking  and  multiple-
marginalization of complementary good (use rights subject to IP protections) are not merely
theoretical possibilities but actual problems in certain branches of industry and in biomedical
science. Most of this positive evidence pertains to situations where many patents read on the
same product, as Lemely and Shapiro have illustrated using cases involving software patents in
the fields of  third generation cellular telephones and WiFi,  where royalty staking exacerbated
patent  hold-p and  further  problems  in  standard-setting contexts where  hundreds  or  even
thousands of patents read on a single product standard.
  Ziedonis  has  provided  systematic  econometric evidence  of  royalty stacking  in  the  U.S.
semiconductor industry,6 and Noel and Schankerman make a parallel case for its presence in the
software industry.7 There have been conflicting views on the question of whether there actually
4 See J.M. Buchanan and Y.J. Yoon, “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons” Journal of Law and Economics,
43(1), 2000: pp. 1-2.
5 M.A. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets” Harvard Law Rev., 111,
1998: pp. 621 ff.
6 R.H. Ziedonis, “Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms”
(2004) 50 Management Science 804.
7 M. Noel and M. Schankerman, “Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation,” Center for Economic Policy Research
Discussion Paper No. 5701, London School of Economics, 2006.
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are anticommons effects on biomedical innovation arising from the patenting of research tools in
the biomedical sciences, as Eisenberg and Nelson have argued.8  Schaft’s9 discussion of the role
of patents in biomedical research, as well as in the software industry, are specific in pointing out
the dangers of royalty stacking in those areas, but whether these result in clear-cut anticommons
impediments to biomedical innovations is another matter. Walsh, Arora, and Cohen reported that
interviews with industry researchers revealed they deployed a  variety of  ways to work around
patents on research tools, including licensing, “inventing around”, and outright infringement.10 A
set  of  parallel  interviews  with  university  scientists  found  no  striking  instances  of  basic
biomedical research projects having been stifled by patents on biomedical research tools.
  Yet, the latter was the case in significant part because the interviewees had simply ignored the
patents  that  would pose  inconvenient obstacles.  Further,  as  David  has pointed out,11 Walsh,
Arora and Cohen’s search for instances in which researchers simply abandoned ongoing projects
when they found themselves blocked by the costs of obtaining patent licenses for key tools is an
unrealistically extreme a test of the anticommons hypothesis;  it presupposes that the problem
could not be foreseen in the research planning stage, well before funding was sought or research
actually got underway.  Were it  foreseen those researcher   who were not  prepared to simply
ignore obstructing patents, would be more likely to have modified their research design, or alter
the objectives  of  the  project  so  as  to  avoid  the  foreseen  intractably  obstacles  to  obtaining
required research tools. 
  Murray and Stern, however, by studying scientific papers that are paired with associated U.S.
patents, find evidence suggesting the there are modest anticommons effects on the exploitation in
applied research of the results of fundamental research findings that provided novel research
tools; following the granting of patents on inventions described in previously published journal
articles,  the frequency of scientific citations to those papers undergoes a significant decrease.12
In biomedical services, as distinct from research activities,  genetic testing is  a branch of the
health care industry where royalty-staking clearly has been identified as a problem, as the report
by  Walsh, Cho and  Cohen  has noticed.13 In the case of  diagnostic kit patents, especially the
Myriad patents on the tests for heritable breast cancer, the effects on the price of suites of tests
each of which is patented has been to push the costs of “bundled tests” so high as to curtail the
demand, with the result that the  number of labs  offering these testing services  has decreased.
This  has  brought  some  negative  externalities  in  the  form  of  a  slowing  of  research  to
improvement  the  tests  diagnostic  accuracy.  Undesirable  as  that  is,  it  does  not  constitute  a
research anticommons problem per se, because it arises (downstream) in a final service industry.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether  or not there are  upstream developments  in genetic
testing that are being blocked by the unwillingness of patent-holders who commercially supply
these high-priced services to license the basic research tools that are need to create new tests. 
8 R.S. Eisenberg and R.R. Nelson, “Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?” Daedelus, 131(2), 2002: pp. 89ff.
9 Wendy H. Schacht, Patent Reform: Issues in the Biomedical and Software Industries, Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 2006).
10 J.P. Walsh, A. Arora and W.M. Cohen, “Working Through the Patent Problem,” Science, 299, 2003: pp. 1021 ff.
11 P.A. David, “The Economic Logic of ‘Open Science’ and the Balance between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain
in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer” in J. Esanu and P.F. Uhlir (eds.), The Role of the Public Domain in Scientific Data
and Information: A National Research Council Symposium. Washington, D.C.: Academy Press, 2003.
12 F. Murray and S. Stern, “Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical
Test of the anti-Commons Hypothesis.”  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 63(4), 2007: pp.648-687.
13 J.P. Walsh, C. Cho and W.M. Cohen, Patents, Material Transfers and Access to Research Inputs in Biomedical Research
(Final Report to the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Intellectual Property rights in Genomic and Protein-Related
Inventions, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2005).
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The generalized “research data anticommons” – a heuristic model
  For convenience in showing the symmetry between the exhaustion of the value of a finite
resource that  is  over-used,  because there are  no exclusion rights  in the hands of  any of the
potential  users of a tangible resource,  and loss of the value of a bundled of resource whose
differentiated but complementary parts are owned by so many monopolists that a resulting high-
priced bundle as a whole remains unutilized, Buchanan and Yoon construct an artificial case: a
physical space that can be used as an urban parking lot.14 Under one regime access to the spaces
are unrestricted (and un-priced), and the lot is completely congested, so that its value to those
needing to park is destroyed. In the other case, to occupy any space requires purchasing many
types  of  (differently  colored)  tickets,  one  from each of  many different  exclusive  owners  of
tickets of a distinct color. The price of the effective permission to park would rise until nobody
would use the spaces, and the value of the resource thereby is destroyed.
  The connection between the effects on scientific research of the distribution of IPR, and this
formal  analysis of the anticommons is perhaps a little too strained to effectively convey the
generality  and the  implications  of  “multiple  marginalization”  for  the  allocation of  resources
among research projects of different kinds. Multiple-marginalization should be seen not only as
potentially impeding the use of patented or copyrighted research tools,  and thereby blocking
some research projects, but, more generally, as degrading the exploration of large data-fields – or
“discovery spaces” formed by the federation of databases – which have become particularly
important
in many exploratory research domains.
  To fix ideas here, one can take as a concrete example, the haplotype map, or "HapMap" as an
emblematic a database tool that  has been created by the National  Human Genome Research
Institute (NHGRI) and other national funding agencies when they undertook the International
Haplotype  Mapping  Project  in  2002.15 The  scientific  purpose  was  to  allow  biomedical
researchers  to  find  genes  and  genetic  variations  that  affect  health  and  disease.  The  DNA
sequence of any two people is 99.9 percent identical, but the variations may greatly affect an
individual's disease risk. Sites in the DNA sequence where individuals differ at a single DNA
base are called single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs – referred to colloquially as “snips”).
Sets of nearby SNPs—on the same chromosome—are inherited in blocks; the pattern of SNPs on
a block is called a haplotype. Blocks may contain a large number of SNPs, yet a few SNPs are
enough to uniquely identify the haplotypes in a block. The HapMap is a map of these haplotype
blocks and the specific SNPs that identify the haplotypes are called “tag SNPs”. By reducing
number of SNPs required to examine the entire genome for association with a phenotype—from
the 10 million SNPs that exist down to roughly 500,000 tag SNPs – the HapMap provides a
means of greatly reducing the costs and effectiveness of research in the field of genetic medicine.
By dispensing with the need for typing more SNPs than the necessary tag SNPS, it raises the
efficiency and comprehensiveness of genome scan approaches to finding regions with genes that
affect diseases.
  One may then imagine the situation of distributed exclusion rights that could arise from the
independent patenting of tagged sequences by separate research groups,  working in different
14 Buchanan and Yoon, “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons,” Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 2000. 
15 See http://www.genome.gov/10001688 [Accessed November 8, 2010].
6
universities and firms. But, even supposing that the SNPs individually were left in the public
domain,  multiple  owners  of  rights  to  exclude  researchers  from searching  for  particular  “tag
SNPs” could arise where legal protections were afforded to database owners who had made an
investment in assembling the contents. Deep-linking and database federation can be impeded by
the legal protection of database rights afforded by national legislation conforming to the EU’s
1996 Directive on the Legal Protection of Data Base Rights, as these apply to both copyrighted
materials or materials that are not copyrightable. Access costs charged by each collection of “tag
SNPs”  would  then  tend  to  impede  the  research  use  of  extensive  “discovery  spaces”  for
exploratory research in genomics, proteinomics and related epidemiological data, even where
owners were prepared to license extracting content from them.16
  To examine this  a  little  more formally,  consider  a  simple  model  of  a  research production
project: the output is results, R, produced under cost-minimizing conditions on a budget of G
^ ` ^ ` ,G p i b i X ª º ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¦
according  to  the  production  function  
 , ,R F S X 
where  X  is  a
vector of inputs of experimental time and equipment and S is the output of a search activity,
according  to  search  function:  
^ ` ^ ` ^ ` 1 , 2 ,...S S b b b B 
,  in  which  b{i}  is  the  information
extracted from database i.
  We may suppose that the search function, S,  takes a special  form described by a constant
elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  production  function,  in  which  the  inputs  b{i}  enter
symmetrically.  The latter  specification holds that  there  is  parity  among the databases  in  the
respective intensities with which they are used in the search process, and is assumed here for
expositional convenience. The same is true of the assumption of first-degree homogeneity, which
abstracts from the possibility of their being either increasing or decreasing returns to scale in
search. In other words, the informational output of the search process, S, will be doubled by
doubling the amount of information extracted from each of the B databases that are examined.
  Further, the specification of the search production function S allows for substitutions among
material  from  different  databases,  indicating  the  ease  of  substitution  by  the  elasticity  of
substitution parameter ı: ı= 0 then corresponds to the condition of strict complementarity in
which no substitutions are possible and the materials to be extracted from the different databases
would be in fixed proportions to one another, regardless of their relative prices; alternatively, ı=
1 corresponds  to  the  (Cobb-Douglas)  case  in  which  a  project’s  cost-minimizing  search  will
allocate invariant shares of its total search budget to each of the B databases, and, given the
assumption of symmetry among them in the search production function, that implies the relative
amounts of data from any pair of databases would vary inversely with the relative unit prices of
the data to be extracted from each.
  For expositional purposes we restrict this discussion of the model's implication to the case in
which  all  research  projects  have  identical  search  strategies,  constrained  by  the  same  search
technology, and the same form of derived demands for database contents. From the (common)
16 See IPR Aspects of Internet Collaborations, EC/Community Research Working Paper, EUR 19456, April 2001, for the
remarks on the importance of “discovery spaces” by Graham Cameron, Director of the European Bioinformatics Institute.  In a
meeting of the EC working party (on January 22, 2001) Cameron stated that to construct anything resembling the existing EBI
federated database structure would be quite infeasible under the access restrictions that had come to prevail in the field of
biogenetics, an observation discussed further by P.A. David, “Will Building ‘Good Fences’ Really Make ‘Good Neighbors’ in
Science?: Digital Technologies, Collaborative Research on the Internet and the EC’s Push for Protection of Intellectual
Property,” Ibid.
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CES production function for “search” one obtains these derived demands for access to database
contents for each project, as a function of unit extraction charges, the project’s real budget level
and the elasticity of substitution among the B databases. Assuming database owners have legal
monopoly rights and set profit-maximizing royalty rates for data extraction independently (as
discriminating monopolists would do), one may solve for the resulting relative prices that will
emerge as the Nash solution from the interactions of the effects of their  price-setting on the
projects’ respective derived demand schedules for the contents of the available set of databases.
The  resulting  prices  then  determine  each  project’s  consequent  cost-minimizing  search,  and,
given its budget constraint, the informational output that will enter its research production and
thereby affect its research output.
The basic  qualitative features of the  results  that  have been discussed in the context  of the
simpler Buchanan-Yoon17 model turn out to hold also in this more general setting. Even if the
b{i}  are  not  strict  complements,  and there  are  symmetrical  non-zero  pairwise  elasticities  of
substitution among them, when database rights are separately owned and priced independently to
maximize the owners’  separate revenues one finds that  the larger  is  the number  of  required
databases  (B),  the  more  severely  degraded  will  be  S.  Hence  R (research  output)  for  given
funding levels will be reduced – so long as S and X are not infinitely substitutable. Of course, the
lower is the elasticity of substitution among the different database inputs in the search activity,
the more marked would be the adverse income effects of the mark-ups charged by database
monopolists on the overall research project’s output, given its fixed budget constraint. 
Where the elasticity of substitution between the search activity and other inputs is unitary the
effects  of  the  independent  pricing strategies  of  the  data-base owners  translate  into degraded
search output, against with there may be offsetting increases in the intensity of other inputs. The
outcome from an economic welfare efficiency viewpoint in this case, as in the standard multiple-
marginalization analysis, can be shown to be inferior to that which would obtain under joint
monopoly ownership of rights to the required (database) inputs.
  The foregoing results may be interpreted to support the intuitive notion that the incidence of the
anticommons problem will  fall  particularly heavily upon exploratory science,  such as that in
bioinformatics where large discovery spaces comprising many (federated) databases are needs.
But the same would hold also for design fields such as advanced computer software, where many
libraries  may  be  searched  for  modular  algorithms  that  have  been  found  to  interoperate  in
unproblematic ways with an existing code base. By contrast, narrowly focused searches, say, for
particular targets in a SNPs database, might be less impacted. Moreover, commercially oriented
R&D  projects  in  which  the  “research”  portion  of  the  budget  is  small  in  relation  to  the
development costs, would be far less likely to be adversely affected because even if it is not
possible to substitute D for R, the impact of the elevated search costs on R will  scarcely be
noticeable in the overall costs of the innovation.
  Perhaps  the  most  interesting  implications  of  this  generalized  model  of  “multiple
marginalization” in the market for legally protected scientific research data are those concerning
the differential incidence of the search-degradation on exploratory research, by comparison with
focused commercial  applications-oriented R&D. This  points to the need for a more nuanced
approach  in  empirical  efforts  to  assess  the  ways  in  which  this  and  other  cost-imposing
dimensions of the anticommons problem would manifest themselves. Reconsidered from that
angle, the conclusions drawn from the questions posed to academic researchers by the pioneering
survey- and interview-based studies of the impact of patented research tools in the biomedical
17 Buchanan and Yoon, “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons,” Journal of Law and Economics 43(1), 2000.
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area seem to be overly sanguine, in supposing that the existence of a “serious anticommons”
effect would take the form of the blocking or abandonment of ongoing research projects. That
such events are reported to be “as rare as the White Tiger,” will be seen not to be surprising,18
and consistent with the existence of more subtle but cumulatively distorting long term effects on
the advance of fundamental science -- upon which the ability to sustain high rates of innovation
will  be  based.  Of  course,  the  apparent  readiness  on  the  part  of  the  academic  biomedical
researchers who were surveyed to simply ignore the question of whether they might be infringing
patented tools  also could account  for  the rarity with which they reported that  their  research
projects were actually blocked by “patent thickets”.
The limits of spontaneous order: anticommons ills that markets can and cannot cure
  Before moving to the conclusion that  protection of exploratory scientific research requires
special measures to counteract the potential harms from anticommons effects, especially where
database protections compound the effects of patent laws, it is proper to us to inquire whether the
problems created by the distribution of IP ownership cannot be solved by the same means. That
question can be treated in two specific connections, considering first the idea that the existence
of transferable rights would allow the problems of search and negotiation costs to be mitigated
by the development of institutionalized solutions modeled on copyright collection societies, and
second, that these might also be a palliative for the “royalty stacking” created by uncoordinated
pricing of bundles of patents that constitute “thickets.”
  The second connection is simply a more general formulation of the latter claim—namely that
owners of complementary intellectual property rights may well have private profit-incentives to
exploit those rights in a collectively managed “pool,” and therefore could act spontaneously to
mitigate  the  worst  inefficiencies  of  multiple-marginalization.  But  the  proposed  copyright
collecting society-like mechanisms on closer inspection turn out to be inadequate to deal with the
core  source  of  the  inefficiency  arising  from  distributed  exclusion  rights  to  complementary
research assets that are protected by patents or by technical means such as encryption in digital
rights managements system.19
  Why can’t private “intermediating” organizations emerge and profit  by providing a market
solution for scientists’ anticommons problems? The answer is that the proposal to encourage the
organization of profit-oriented collections societies is based upon an inadequate analogy with the
problems  in  music  copyrights  and  performance  rights  that  induced  the  formation  of  such
institutions. This “solution” aims to reduce costs of search and transacting, and lower the costs of
rights  enforcement,  by  using  economies  of  scale  and  scope  in  search,  and  reutilizing  the
information in repeated licensing transactions. By making the use of IPR less costly, collecting
societies  could  actually  encourage  greater  research  production—by  inducing  widespread
patenting  of  research  tools.  In  addition,  the  collections  society  has  an  incentive  to  write
contractual provisions (e.g., grant backs), in order to induce non-cooperating owners to share use
of their exploitation right in exchange for royalties. While accomplishing all that does sound like
a good thing, it may be too good to be realistic. There are quite a number of reasons why private
18 P.A. David, “The Economic Logic of ‘Open Science’ and the Balance between private Property Rights and the Public Domain
in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer,” in The Role of the Public Domain in Scientific and Technical Data and
Information: A National Research Council Symposium, J. Esanu and P.F. Uhlir, eds., Washington, D.C.: Academy Press, 2003
[Available as SIEPR Discussion Paper 02-03, at: http://siepr.stanford.edu/publicationsprofile/445].
19 This draws upon the argument made by Michael Spence in a 2006 comment, (privately communicated) and subsequently
published in M. Spence, “Clearing House Mechanisms: Conceptual Framework: Comment on a Paper by Esther Van
Zimmerman” in G. Van Overwalle, ed., Gene Patents and Clearing Models,  Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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“intermediating” institutions are not the best,  or  even the second-best  solution for scientists’
anticommons problems.
  First, there are likely to be feasibility and cost problems with the generic “collections society
solution” that  don't  cause comparable  difficulties  with the  copyright  collecting organizations
because they deal  with a form of IP that is very different from the contents of patents,  and
database rights:
x Copyright authors typically want their products distributed widely, but this is not
so generally the case with patents.
x Copyrights in songs, in texts and even images are more likely to be substitutes
than is the case with patents, and scientific data.
x Copyright collections societies target specific use-markets, but uses of research
tools are much wider and more difficult to predict, so pricing decisions are more
difficult.
  Secondly, while there most likely would be cost-savings in patent searches and the location of
specialized  scientific  databases,  and  in  identifying  the  rights-holders  who  will  grant  non-
exclusive licenses, it is possible that the consequences of these could be perverse. Spence points
out that by making the use of IPR easier for universities and other public research organizations,
a collections society approach could also encourage strategic uses of licensing terms that would
disadvantage rival research projects, or encumber researchers in rival institutions.20 The view
that universities would not behave that way seems overly sanguine in ignoring the competitive
pressures under which many of these institutions are operating today. Some U.S. universities
holding biomedical patents have not been hesitant to write letters pointing out infringements, and
requesting that the letter-recipients apply for licenses. In the UK several universities have been
drawn into  conflicts  with  one  another  over  competing  claims  to  the  same  database  that,  in
various stages of  its  development,  was hosted on their  websites by a researcher  who career
exhibited the mobility one might expect of a talented contributor to the biogenetics literature.21
  Next, one has to ask whether there will be an improvement on the existing situation in the
public sector—where, according to Walsh, Arora and Cohen, academic biomedical researchers
say they just ignore patents.22 Compared to the state of non-compliance and non-enforcement,
collections  societies  could  make  things  much  worse  from the  viewpoint  of  public  research
productivity—while improving compliance with the law. There is a trade-off  here, but some
might argue that the most effective way to remove a bad law is to enforce it vigorously.
  Fourthly, and by no means least in significance, the historical record of the music copyright and
performance  right  collections  societies  reveals  a  potential  for  abuse  of  market  position.23
20 See Spence (2009).
21 See, e.g., the case of the “PRINTS” database, related by T.K. Attwood “Mobile, Metamorphosing Academic Databases –
Capturing IP on the Move” in Workshop Report on Managing IPR in knowledge-based economy- Bioinformatics and the
influence of public policy.  European Commission DG Research – Fifth Framework Programme, 2001.  For comments on this
instance of ambiguous ownership of a database created by an institutionally mobile research scientist, see P.A. David and M.
Spence, “Towards Institutional Infrastructures for e-Science: The Scope of the Challenges,”  A Report to the Joint Information
Systems Committee of the Research Councils of Great Britain, Oxford Internet Institute Report No. 2 September 2003 [Available
at: http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/resources/publications/OIIRR_E-Science_0903.pdf]: p.42 and Appendix 5.
22 J. Walsh, A. Arora and W. Cohen, “Working Through the Patent Problem” Science, 299, 2003:pp.1021 ff.
23 See, e.g. M. A. Einhorn, “Transactions Costs and Administered Markets: License Contracts for Music Performance Rights,”
Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 3(1) 2006: pp.61-74.
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Bundling  of  wanted  and  unwanted  licenses  is  an  attractive  strategy  for  the  society,  so
competition authority supervision would be needed on that score, as well as on grounds that the
interests of members of those societies shift in the course of their development toward attempting
to exclude variant content that could be substituted for that of the existing rights holders. It may
well be the case, however, that the existence of more than one cluster of complementary research
tools is a reflection of the useful adaptation of tool-sets to variant problems that are specific to
different  research  domains,  or  to  special  research  environments.  Forcing  users  to  pay  for
redundant alternatives is an abuse, but so is denying them access to alternatives that are not
always redundant in order to raise the rent that can be extracted from those that are provided.
True,  the  collecting  societies  in  the  field  of  music  performance  rights  are  restrained  from
excessive  pricing by the  adverse  effects  on revenue,  but  that  is  in  large  part  because  other
copyright material are available as substitutes. This condition is less usual in the case of patents,
and,  especially  when  some  patents  in  the  bundle  that  were  complements,  there  may  be
unjustifiably big markups.
  The burden of this analysis therefore is that substantial  doubt surrounds the wisdom of an
implicit  policy  position  that  prefers  letting  “anticommons  problems”  be  remedied  by  the
workings  of  new  institutions  engendered  by  forces  in  the  markets  for  valuable  intellectual
property. Thus, some positive policy action would appear to be called for, particularly in view of
the distribution of IP rights to exploit research results arising from publicly funded R&D projects
that is being produced by the workings of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the United States, and
kindred  legislative  and  administrative  measures  introduced  in  the  EU  and  elsewhere.  The
proposals in the following section offer a preliminary response to that challenge.
Common-use contracting in IPRs -- clearing pathways through some “mental thickets”
  A discussion of suitable policy measures would aim to (1) clarify the meaning and practical
significance of the idea of legally creating an “information common” for scientific and technical
research  communities  by  means  of  common-use  contracting,  (2)  inquire  into  the  conditions
under which these are likely to emerge spontaneously as “clubs” or “pools” among holders of
IPR in research tools and databases, rather than having to be pro-actively encourage by public
agencies, and (3) consider specific policy measures that would be appropriate and effective in
promoting participation of universities and other public research organizations in IPR licensing
arrangements of that kind. It is possible on this occasion only to touch upon some of the salient
points under each of those headings.
To make space for the “commons solution” one needs to clear away economists and
lawyers’ misconceptions about “the commons,” and stop textbook repetitions of the travesty of
the ‘Tragedy’, like this one:
“The anticommons is a play on words and refers to the ‘tragedy of the commons’
which is taught in freshman economics. In the tragedy of the commons peasants
in early modern Britain overgrazed shared pastures (‘the commons’) because the
absence of private property eliminated incentives to conserve.”24
  The historical reality is totally different. Contrary to the historical fantasy of a “common pool
problem” promulgated in the influential  essay by Garrett  Hardin,25 this “tragedy” never was:
24 S. Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives, Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, (2004) p.88.
25 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” Science, 162, 1968: pp. 1243 ff.
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from the 13th century onwards, the records of Europe’s agrarian communes detail regulations
adopted  “by  common  consent”  of  the  villeins  (tenants)  to  control  the  exercise  of  rights  of
common grazing on the fallow fields, the meadows, and the stubble-fields (the postharvest grain-
fields) of the village’s arable land. Internal management accompanied exclusion of strangers.
Ostrom’s,26 and subsequent works on “common property resources,” have shown the relevance
of this to real resource problems in developing economies. Studies of the historical experience of
successfully managed common property resources document this abundantly. For example, by
the ‘early modern era’ in Britain, and equally in the more densely settle arable farming regions of
northern Europe, the management of common grazing rights prescribed stinting: tenants in the
village were allocated “stints” that specified the numbers of specific animals that commoners
could put on the fallow or common pasture lands, apportioning these rights in relation to the size
of their holdings in the arable field, and sometimes in the meadowland.
  The Commons  in  tangible exhaustible resources is  not  a  defunct  institution,  for  collective
ownership of exhaustible resources did not, and does not translate automatically into a chaotic
struggle for possession among neighbors, nor does it result in the egalitarian distribution of use-
rights. Even in western Europe today, such arrangements based upon de jure common use rights
(res communas) dating from the Middle Ages have survived in the Swiss Alps and Northern Italy
—e.g., the Magnifica Comunità di Fiemme, in the valley of Aviso (Trento)—where they still
govern the use of tens of thousands of hectares of alpine forests,  pasture and meadow land.
Moreover,  a  growing  number  of  contemporary  empirical  studies  in  the  developing  world—
following Ostrom —also are showing how common pool resources can be managed successfully
under a variety of common property regimes.
Selective implementation of common-use contracting: efficient IPR pooling agreements
  The  case  for  efficient  patent  pools27 rests  on  overcoming  the  obstacles  to  research  and
innovation posed by the growth of “thickets” and designed complementarities  in claims that
create blocking patents.  It  is  recognized that  pooling creates  a potential  for  anti-competitive
behavior, notably the bundling together of essential strong and high-value patents with weak and
inessential low value patents as a means of extracting greater royalty revenues. Consequently,
some  means  of  defusing generic  antitrust  objections  to  pooling would  advance the case  for
efficient pooling. 
  An empirical procedure for establishing the likelihood that an inefficient patent cluster, i.e., a
“thicket” had formed would go some way to addressing this issue, and it is therefore is relevant
to notice Clarkson’s proposal  and practical demonstration of the a method of using network
analysis to discover patent thickets and disqualify them as ineligible for efficient pool status.28
Nevertheless, dual pricing policies by foundations running PRC-i’s, would be potentially subject
to abuse, and competition among those proposed foundations will be quite limited if they are
successful  in  internalizing  complementarities.  Therefore,  that  there  would  be  a  need  for
continuing monitoring of the PRC-i foundations and vigorous anti-trust supervision seems an
inescapable conclusion. 
26 See, e.g., E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York: Cambridge
University Press, (199); E. Ostrom, J.S. Walker, and R. Gardner, Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1994.
27 See e.g., J. Lerner and J. Tirole, “Efficient Patent Pools,” American Economic Review, 94(2) June 2004: pp 691-711.
28 G. Clarkson, “Objective Identification of Patent Thickets”, Harvard Business School Working Paper, version 3.9. 2004.
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To create “research commons” by common-use licensing of intellectual  property is  not  an
unprecedented idea,  however.  Indeed,  it  has  been gaining adherents  recently  in  a  variety  of
practical  forms.  Free  and  Open Source  Software (FOSS) is  by  now a  familiar  approach  to
ensuring  access  to  software  tools,  using  copyright  licensing  terms:  GNU  GPL  (‘copyleft’
principle) requires distributors of code to do so on the same open source, royalty free, attribution
basis on which they received the code, providing contributors of software licensed in this way
with the prospective benefits of having reciprocal access to the code that other will build upon it.
Less well  known than  FOSS,  Science Common29 was launched under  the  aegis  of  Creative
Commons in 2005, with the goal of bringing to the world of scientific endeavors the benefits of
openness and sharing the goal of bringing the openness and sharing that have made Creative
Commons licenses a success in the arts and cultural fields. Its projects enlist its own technical
and legal experts, and mobilize others to  designs strategies and tools for faster, more efficient
Web-enabled  scientific  research—through  common  use  licensing  of  data  contributed  to
repositories,  cross-licensing of patented research tools,  pre-commitment  to standard materials
transfer licensing on RAND terms.
  Science Common’s Neurocommons Project,30 collaboration between Science Commons and the
Teranode Corporation, is building on open access scientific information and data – content that is
digital, online, free of charge, and free of most copyright and licensing restrictions—to build a
semantic web for neuroscience research.   A semantic web can be conceptualized as a graph or
network of connections among distinct bodies of information and/or data that is grounded on a
set  of  common  standards  to  describe  and  name  the  relationships  that  are  contemplated  and
described in text: relational statements in the life sciences might take forms such as “this gene is
active in this disease”, “is related to this protein”, “which is folded in this way”, etc. Using the
standard allows one to republish content of this kind in a format that researchers can use software
(running search engines, browsers, statistical analysis) to search, evaluate, form new links and
integrate with content in other specialized knowledge domains. This initiative aims to create an
efficiently usable, managed, open access commons that will empower neuroscience researchers,
and to create a demonstration model of the way this can be done that will be portable, and thus
help to transform other complex fields of research activity. 
  Other “commons-like” initiatives provide public domain access to otherwise patentable material
under licensing conditions that restrict users from appropriating the benefits by utilizing it  to
obtain IRP on new, commercially valuable research products, or, alternatively retain ownership
but irrevocably allow other to freely use patents that are place in the commons but select those
contributions to be those having applications in a particular desired sphere. Considering just two
cases, first, the well established HapMap Project, and then the very recently formed and still
experimental Eco-Patent Commons will be sufficient to exhibit the range of diversity in these
promising developments. 
HapMap project
The HapMap project followed the precedents established by the Human Genome Project31 by
rejecting protection of the data  under copyright  or database rights,  and establishing a policy
requiring participants to release individual genotype data to all the project members as soon as it
29 See http://neurocommons.org/page/Main_Page [Accessed November 8, 2010].
30 See http://neuroscience.org [Accessed November 8, 2010].
31 HGP, see http://www.genome.gov/10001688 [Accessed November 8, 2010].
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was identified. It was recognized that any of the teams with access to the database might be able
to  take  that  data  and,  by  combining  it  with  their  own  genotype  data,  generate  sufficient
information to file a patent on haplotypes whose phenotypic association with disease made them
of medical interest. To prevent this, a temporary “click-wrap license” was created—the  IHMP
Public Access License—which does not assert copyright on the underlying data, but requires all
who accessed the project database to agree not to file patents where they had relied in part on
HapMap data.
  The HapMap thus represents a special case of legal jujitsu, where a copyleft strategy has been
mutually imposed on database users by an enforceable contract in the absence of IPR ownership.
Technological protection of the database at a level sufficient to compel users to take the “click-
wrap” license makes it possible to dispense with the legal protection of asserting copyright in
order to use “copyleft” licenses. 
Eco-Patent Commons
The Eco-Patent Commons, launched in January 2008 by IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes and Sony in
partnership with the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, was founded on the
commitment  that  anyone  who  wants  to  bring  environmental  benefits  to  market  can  use  the
patents that are contributed to the commons to protect the environment and enable collaboration
between businesses that foster new innovations. This appears to be a response to the perception
that  technology  transfers  unencumbered  by  licensing  restrictions  and  royalties  will  be  an
important mechanism in the diffusion of new technologies that can contributed to mitigation of
climate  change,  and  encourage  downstream  inventions  that  build  upon  or  work  in  a
complementary manner with those in the commons.
  According it its website,32 the objectives of this undertaking are “to provide an avenue by which
innovations and solutions may be easily shared to accelerate and facilitate implementation to
protect the environment and perhaps lead to further innovation”, and “promote and encourage
cooperation  and  collaboration  between businesses  that  pledge  patents  and  potential  users  to
foster further joint innovations and the advancement and development of solutions that benefit
the  environment.”  Since  its  launch,  100  “eco-friendly  patents  have  been  pledged  by  11
companies who retain ownership of their pledge patents, and bear the associated costs, but make
the patents freely available for use by third parties.
  An initial study of 92 of these pledged patents by Hall and Helmers33 finds that the participating
firms appear to be doing more or less what they claim, pledging valuable “green” patents (more
valuable  than  the  average  patent  in  their  respective  portfolios),  although about  a  fifth  have
expired, and a seventh have not yet issued. Because, under the regulations, third parties do not
need to notify the owners of the pledged patents when they use them, it  will  be difficult  to
statistically evaluate the Eco-Patent Common’s effectiveness in diffusing green technologies and
stimulating upstream innovation by non-pledging firms,  or for the pledging firms to quickly
identify new technologies that are being built on the patents they contribute to the pool. It is too
early to assess the success of this initiative but it demonstrates at least that there are contexts in
which private corporations are prepared to act on the premise that they will benefit along with
others by sharing resources that are building blocks for innovations that – as is the case with
32 See http://www.wbcsd.org [Accessed November 8, 2010].
33 B.H. Hall and C. Helmers, “Innovation in Clean/Green Technology: Can Patent Commons Help?” Discussion Paper presented
at the EPIP Annual Meeting, Held in Maastricht, the Netherlands (September 20-22, 2010).
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climate change mitigating technologies – have potential to yield large “public goods” spillovers.
.
A summary of the argument, and where it leads us
  This article has advanced the case for a particular approach to restoring a healthier balance
between  proprietary  arrangements  governing  the  commercial  exploitation  and  private
appropriation of research results, as an incentive mechanism to drive invention and innovation,
and the provision of open data and information infrastructures that emulate features of the public
domain that are particularly hospitable for and efficient in active and collaborate research aimed
at increasing the stock of reliable scientific knowledge.  National funding agencies should be
urged to agree individually and jointly to exercise their authority over the conditions governing
the use of public research funds in order to require that data created on such projects be placed in
open repositories, and to impose common-use licensing of IPR in complementary research “tool
sets”.  These agencies should set management rules for the irrevocable assignment of IPR to
regulated “public research commons  in information” (PRC-i)  when such rights  arise directly
from projects that draw significant public funding.
  The argument for this course of action has been developed here in seven steps, or propositions:
• Prop. 1: 
Scientific and technical research in the modern world entails the production of data and
information  (which  are  international  public  goods)  by  means  of  the  same  class  of
international public goods.
• Prop. 2: 
There are three pure types of institutional solutions—property, patronage and (public)
provision—for the allocation problems in the production and distribution of information
that arise from the latter’s public goods properties.
• Prop. 3: 
Each of  the  “3  Ps”  offers  an  imperfect  solution,  and most  of  the  successful  modern
economies  employ  all  of  them in  some  degree,  but  the  mixture  has  shifted  towards
property.
• Prop. 4: 
The  “property  solution”  (IPR)  creates  legal  monopoly  rights  to  exploit  the  new
information,  and  may  improve  the  market  allocation  of  resources  in  information
production through the incentive effects; but commercial exploitation of the rights itself
inhibits information use—and the “deadweight burden” that is incurred in scientific and
technological research itself is likely to be particularly heavy for society.
• Prop.5: 
Information  disclosed  and  left  in  the  public  domain  enables  the  efficient  growth  of
knowledge through the conduct of “open science” research, so long as (a) patronage is
available  and  (b)  “enclosures”  of  the  public  domain  does  not  impede  access  to  the
research tools.
• Prop.6: 
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There  are  conditions  under  which  IPR  in  research  tools  is  particularly  damaging  to
scientific progress, these have come to be referred to loosely as “the anticommons”—
which  needs  to  be  precisely  defined;  in  those  conditions,  “common-use”  pooling  of
information resources is likely to be both socially more efficient, and a dominant strategy
for researchers.
• Prop.7: 
IPR  owners  can  contractually  construct  “information  commons”  that  emulate  public
domain conditions that will be sustainable against opportunistic “enclosure”; and in the
case of a non-exhaustible resources (information), there is good reason not to exclude any
contributor  of  IPR  to  the  research  commons—so  long  as  the  additions  also  are
complements of the rights from which the existing PRC-i has been formed.
Some closing remarks are now in order, with regard to the political economy aspects of
the proposed programme of ameliorative actions. The policy thrust of the argument that has been
advance here may be seen as tantamount to (indirectly) reforming the workings of the Bayh-Dole
and Stevenson-Wydler  Acts  in  the  United States and parallel  legislative  measures  that  were
subsequently introduced in a number of OECD countries. It calls for the development of specific
institutional  arrangements  for  the  administration  of  “scientific  research  commons”  (SRCs)
formed by IP right-holders that would need to address five key issues. These include:
x conditions of eligibility to participate
x limitations upon the scope of legally protected content that can be placed       within the
commons
x principles for the management and pricing of licenses granted to non- commoner for use
of intellectual property rights contributed to, and arising     from the utilization of pooled
research assets relationships among independent  SRCs and between SRCs formed by
universities  and  other  public  sector  research  organizations  that  presently  maintain
technology licensing/transfer offices
x the implications of competition policy safe-guards against the creation of       inefficient
pools, and the abuse of patent cartel power.
  The foregoing is in a sense a way to describe the features of the destination at which I advocate
we should seek to arrive.  What it does not indicate is whether this is a feasible route for making
such  a  journey  from  where  we  now  find  ourselves.  It  surely  is  important  to  design  a
transformative  process  that  has  favorable  transition  dynamics.  Thus,  each  commons  would
provide positive externalities to those who join, and those who are already participating, to the
extent that the new use-rights are complements of those already in the pool. But in general these
benefits  will  be  more  attractive  to  universities  will  small  and  less  coherently  structured  IP
portfolios,  and  offer  less  to  the  comparatively  few  institutions  that  have  many  patents  and
effective, well funded TLO operations.
  On the other hand, the question is whether the immediate portfolio return consideration of those
research universities and their TLO staffs will prevail over the interests of their researchers in
pursuing fundamental  scientific  research  un-encumbered  by the  need  to  overcome,  or  avoid
obstacles created by the dispersed distribution of patent holding on research tools. In general it
may be supposed that the interests of leading researchers that have a demonstrated capacity to
gain public funding will  weigh heavily with all  but the most myopic and reckless university
administrators. This is a hopeful notion, because it implies that even when influential academic
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scientists are prepared to simply ignore other institutions patents, public funding agencies could
set conditions for grant recipients to pool patents on relevant tools that their institution owns with
those held by other public grant  recipients.  This could be done a condition for eligibility to
submit grant proposals, which would create a strong incentive for university compliance if they
sought to retain the scientists that had promising trajectories of research in that field.
  The problem with this approach, however, is that it is not clear that such researchers will be
ubiquitously  distributed  among  the  research  universities,  so  where  they  were  not  currently
present, patent-holdings at those institutions could contain “unpooled” blocking patents. Across-
the-board  pooling  requirements  would  address  that  defect,  but  at  the  expense  of  mobilizing
opposition from all those with less to gain from securing their star researchers’  eligibility to
compete for public research funding.
  Another  potential  problem with bottom up coalition formation  on behalf  of  the  commons
building goal concerns the interests of the university technology licensing professional that have
become a potentially important lobbying force in the U.S.,  and may be emulated elsewhere.
There  will  be  winners  and  losers  if  the  business  now  conducted  in  many  small  TLO’s  is
consolidated in the hands of a smaller number of regional- and domain-specific independent
foundations.  The public research funding agencies and major private charities have crucial roles
to play in bringing the handful of large but important research institutions that have been gainers
under the existing regime into the new scientific research commons. That probably is not the best
place to begin, however.   
 In short, on this proposed journey of institutional reform, like many journeys worth undertaking
for “the arrival” rather than the intrinsic pleasures of travel,  one should expect to meet with
impediments.  In order to succeed it  will  demand sophisticated reconnoitering of the difficult
political  terrain  to  be  traversed,  careful  attention  to  questions  of  sequencing,  and  very
considerable patience and persistence. But it ought not to be deferred.
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